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Abstract
In [1], authors considered a general finite horizon model of dynamic game of asymmetric infor-
mation, where N players have types evolving as independent Markovian process, where each player
observes its own type perfectly and actions of all players. The authors present a sequential decomposition
algorithm to find all structured perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game. The algorithm consists of solving
a class of fixed-point of equations for each time t, whose existence was left as an open question. In
this paper, we prove existence of these fixed-point equations for compact metric spaces.
I. INTRODUCTION
Authors in [1] considered a model consisting of strategic players having types that evolve as
conditionally independent Markov controlled processes. Players observe their types privately and
actions taken by all players are observed publicly. Instantaneous reward for each player depends
on everyone’s types and actions. The proposed methodology provides a decomposition of the
interdependence between beliefs and strategies in PBE and enables a systematic evaluation of a
subset of PBE, namely structured perfect Bayesian equilibria (SPBE). Here SPBE are defined as
equilibria with players strategies based on their current private type and a set of beliefs on each
player’s current private type, which is common to all the players and whose domain is time-
invariant. The beliefs on players’ types are such that they can be updated individually for each
player and sequentially w.r.t. time. The model allows for signaling amongst players as beliefs
depend on strategies. They present a sequential decomposition methodology for calculating all
SPBEs for finite and infinite horizon dynamic games with asymmetric information.
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2For the finite horizon model, they provide a two-step algorithm involving a backward recursion
followed by a forward recursion. The algorithm works as follows. In the backward recursion, for
every time period, the algorithm finds an equilibrium generating function defined for all possible
common beliefs at that time. This involves solving a one-step fixed point equation on the space
of probability simplexes. Existence of this fixed-point equation was left as an open question. If
there exists a solution for every common belief πt, then the equilibrium strategies and beliefs are
obtained through a forward recursion using the equilibrium generating function obtained in the
backward step and the Bayes update rule. A similar notion of equilibrium was defined in [2], [3]
where authors provide a sequential decomposition algorithm to compute common information
based perfect Bayesian equilibrium. In [3], it was shown that such an equilibrium exists for
zero-sum games.
In this paper, we consider the finite horizon game with all sets of variables in a compact
metric space. We show that there always exists an SPBE for such a game. Since it is proved
in [1] that all SPBEs can be found using their algorithm, we conclude that there always exists
a solution to the fixed-point equation considered in [1] for each time period t.
II. MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
We consider a discrete-time dynamical system with N strategic players in the set N
△
=
{1, 2, . . .N}. We consider two cases: finite horizon T
△
= {1, 2, . . . T} with perfect recall and
infinite horizon with perfect recall. The system state is Xt
△
= (X1t , X
2
t , . . .X
N
t ), where X
i
t ∈ X
i
is the type of player i at time t, which is perfectly observed and is its private information.
Players’ types evolve as conditionally independent, controlled Markov processes such that
P(x1) =
N∏
i=1
Qi1(x
i
1) (1a)
P(xt|x1:t−1, a1:t−1) = P(xt|xt−1, at−1) (1b)
=
N∏
i=1
Qit(x
i
t|x
i
t−1, at−1), (1c)
where Qit are known kernels. Player i at time t takes action a
i
t ∈ A
i on observing the actions
a1:t−1 = (ak)k=1,...,t−1 where ak =
(
a
j
k
)
j∈N
, which is common information among players,
and the types xi1:t, which it observes privately. The sets A
i,X i are assumed to be finite. Let
gi = (git)t∈T be a probabilistic strategy of player i where g
i
t : A
t−1 × (X i)t → ∆(Ai) such that
player i plays action Ait according to A
i
t ∼ g
i
t(·|a1:t−1, x
i
1:t). Let g
△
= (gi)i∈N be a strategy profile
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3of all players. At the end of interval t, player i receives an instantaneous reward Rit(xt, at). To
preserve the information structure of the problem, it is assumed that players do not observe their
rewards until the end of game.1 The reward functions and state transition kernels are common
knowledge among the players. For the finite-horizon problem, the objective of player i is to
maximize its total expected reward
J i,g
△
= Eg
{
T∑
t=1
Rit(Xt, At)
}
. (2)
A. Preliminaries
Any history of this game at which players take action is of the form ht = (a1:t−1, x1:t). Let Ht
be the set of such histories,HT
△
= ∪Tt=0Ht be the set of all possible such histories in finite horizon
and H∞
△
= ∪∞t=0Ht for infinite horizon. At any time t player i observes h
i
t = (a1:t−1, x
i
1:t) and
all players together have hct = a1:t−1 as common history. Let H
i
t be the set of observed histories
of player i at time t and Hct be the set of common histories at time t. An appropriate concept
of equilibrium for such games is PBE [4], which consists of a pair (β∗, µ∗) of strategy profile
β∗ = (β∗,it )t∈T ,i∈N where β
∗,i
t : H
i
t → ∆(A
i) and a belief profile µ∗ = (iµ∗t )t∈T ,i∈N where
iµ∗t : H
i
t → ∆(Ht) that satisfy sequential rationality so that ∀i ∈ N , t ∈ T , h
i
t ∈ H
i
t, β
i
W
i,β∗,i,T
t (h
i
t) ≥W
i,βi,T
t (h
i
t) (3)
where the reward-to-go is defined as
W
i,βi,T
t (h
i
t) , E
βiβ∗,−i, iµ∗t [h
i
t]
{
T∑
n=t
Rin(Xn, An)
∣∣∣hit
}
, (4)
and the beliefs satisfy some consistency conditions as described in [4, p. 331]. In general, a
belief for player i at time t, iµ∗t is defined on history ht = (a1:t−1, x1:t) given its private history
hit = (a1:t−1, x
i
1:t). Here player i’s private history h
i
t = (a1:t−1, x
i
1:t) consists of a public part
hct = a1:t−1 and a private part x
i
1:t. At any time t, the relevant uncertainty player i has is
about other players’ types x−i1:t ∈ ×
t
n=1 (×j 6=iX
j) and their future actions. Due to independence
of types, and given the common history hct , player i’s type history x
i
1:t does not provide any
additional information about x−i1:t, as will be shown later. For this reason only those beliefs are
1Alternatively, we could have assumed instantaneous reward of a player to depend only on its own type, i.e. be of the form
Rit(x
i
t, at), and have allowed rewards to be observed by the players during the game as this would not alter the information
structure of the game
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4considered that are functions of each player’s history hit only through the common history h
c
t .
Hence, for each player i, its belief for each history hct = a1:t−1 is derived from a common belief
µ∗t [a1:t−1]. Furthermore, as will be shown later, this belief factorizes into a product of marginals∏
j∈N µ
∗,j
t [a1:t−1]. Thus the following system of beliefs can suffiently be used, µ
∗ = (µ∗
t
)t∈T ,
where µ∗
t
= (µ∗,it )i∈N , and µ
∗,i
t : H
c
t → ∆(X
i), with the understanding that player i’s belief
on x−it is µ
∗,−i
t [a1:t−1](x
−i
t ) =
∏
j 6=i µ
∗,j
t [a1:t−1](x
j
t ). Under the above structure, all consistency
conditions that are required for PBEs [4, p. 331] are automatically satisfied.
III. STRUCTURED PERFECT BAYESIAN ALGORITHM
At any time t, player i has information (a1:t−1, x
i
1:t) where a1:t−1 is the common information
among players, and xi1:t is the private information of player i. Since (a1:t−1, x
i
1:t) increases with
time, any strategy of the form Ait ∼ g
i
t(·|a1:t−1, x
i
1:t) becomes unwieldy. Thus it is desirable to
have an information state in a time-invariant space that succinctly summarizes (a1:t−1, x
i
1:t), and
that can be sequentially updated. IFor any strategy profile g, belief πt on Xt, πt ∈ ∆(X ), is
defined as πt(xt)
△
= Pg(Xt = xt|a1:t−1), ∀xt ∈ X . Define the marginals πit(x
i
t)
△
= Pg(X it =
xit|a1:t−1), ∀x
i
t ∈ X
i.
Then using common information approach [5], the problem is posed as follows: player i at time
t observes a1:t−1 and takes action γ
i
t , where γ
i
t : X
i → ∆(Ai) is a partial (stochastic) function
from its private information xit to a
i
t, of the form A
i
t ∼ γ
i
t(·|x
i
t). These actions are generated
through some policy ψi = (ψit)t∈T , ψ
i
t : A
t−1 → {X i → ∆(Ai)}, that operates on the common
information a1:t−1 such that γ
i
t = ψ
i
t[a1:t−1]. Then any policy of the form A
i
t ∼ s
i
t(·|a1:t−1, x
i
t) is
equivalent to Ait ∼ ψ
i
t[a1:t−1](·|x
i
t).
A. Forward/Backward algorithm
In Lemma 3 in Appendix B of [1], it is shown that due to the independence of types and their
evolution as independent controlled Markov processes, for any strategy of the players, the joint
common belief can be factorized as a product of its marginals i.e., πt(xt) =
∏N
i=1 π
i
t(x
i
t), ∀xt.
Define πt ∈ ×i∈N∆(X
i) as vector of marginal beliefs where πt := (π
i
t)i∈N . Similarly define the
vector of belief updates as F (π, γ, a) := (F i(πi, γi, a))i∈N where (using Bayes rule)
F i(πi, γi, a)(xit+1) =
DRAFT May 13, 2020
5
∑
xi
t
πi(xit)γ
i(ai|xit)Q
i
t(x
i
t+1|x
i
t,a)∑
x˜i
t
πi(x˜it)γ
i(ai|x˜it)
if
∑
x˜it
πi(x˜it)γ
i(ai|x˜it) > 0∑
xit
πi(xit)Q
i
t(x
i
t+1|x
i
t, a) if
∑
x˜it
πi(x˜it)γ
i(ai|x˜it) = 0.
(5)
In the following, a backward-forward algorithm is presented that evaluates SPBE. where it is
shown in [1, Theorem 2], this is a “canonical” methodology, in the sense that all SPBE can be
generated this way.
B. Backward Recursion
In this section, define an equilibrium generating function
θ = (θit)i∈N ,t∈T , where θ
i
t : ×i∈N∆(X
i) → {X i → ∆(Ai)}. In addition, define a sequence of
reward-to-go functions of player i at time t, (V it )i∈N ,t∈{1,2,...T+1}, where V
i
t : ×i∈N∆(X
i)×X i →
R. These quantities are generated through a backward recursive way, as follows.
1. Initialize ∀πT+1 ∈ ×i∈N∆(X
i), xiT+1 ∈ X
i,
V iT+1(πT+1, x
i
T+1)
△
= 0. (6)
2. For t = T, T − 1, . . . 1, ∀πt ∈ ×i∈N∆(X
i), πt =
∏
i∈N π
i
t, let θt[πt] be generated as follows.
Set γ˜t = θt[πt], where γ˜t is the solution, if it exists, of the following fixed-point equation,
∀i ∈ N , xit ∈ X
i,
γ˜it(·|x
i
t) ∈ arg max
γit(·|x
i
t)
E
γit(·|x
i
t)γ˜
−i
t , πt
{
Rit(Xt, At)+
V it+1(F (πt, γ˜t, At), X
i
t+1)
∣∣∣xit} , (7)
where expectation in (7) is with respect to random variables (X−it , At, X
i
t+1) through the
measure π−it (x
−i
t )γ
i
t(a
i
t|x
i
t)γ˜
−i
t (a
−i
t |x
−i
t )Q
i
t+1(x
i
t+1|x
i
t, at) and F is defined above.
Furthermore, using the quantity γ˜t found above, define
V it (πt, x
i
t)
△
=Eγ˜
i
t(·|x
i
t)γ˜
−i
t , πt
{
Rit(Xt, At)
+V it+1(F (πt, γ˜t, At), X
i
t+1)
∣∣∣xit} . (8)
Then
Theorem 1 ( [1]): A strategy and belief profile (β∗, µ∗), constructed through the backward-
forward recursion algorithm is a PBE of the game, i.e., ∀i ∈ N , t ∈ T , a1:t−1 ∈ H
c
t , x
i
1:t ∈
(X i)t, βi,
E
β
∗,i
t:T
β
∗,−i
t:T
, µ∗t [a1:t−1]
{
T∑
n=t
Rin(Xn, An)
∣∣∣a1:t−1, xi1:t
}
≥
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βi
t:T
β
∗,−i
t:T
, µ∗t [a1:t−1]
{
T∑
n=t
Rin(Xn, An)
∣∣∣a1:t−1, xi1:t
}
. (9)
Theorem 2 ( [1]): Let (β∗, µ∗) be an SPBE. Then there exists an equilibrium generating
function φ that satisfies (7) in backward recursion ∀ πt = µ∗t [a1:t−1], ∀ a1:t−1, such that (β
∗, µ∗)
is defined through forward recursion using φ.
IV. MAIN RESULT: EXISTENCE
In this section, we present the main result of this paper where we show that for all ∀πt ∈
×i∈N∆(X i), πt =
∏
i∈N π
i
t, there always exists a γ˜ = θ[πt] that satisfies (7). We show that
existence holds true for any compact metric spaces X ,A. Let Σ be the set of all mixed strategies
of the form σit(·|a1:t−1, x
i
t). Then Σ is compact.
Lemma 1: Let ǫ > 0.
(a) Let L be a standard measure on Ai such that for any non empty open measurable set V in
the Borel space B(Ai), L(V ) > 0 i.e. L puts non zero measure on every non-empty open
measurable set of Ai.2 Let Σǫ1 ⊂ Σ be the space of such strategies such that if σ ∈ Σ
ǫ
1 then
for all i ∈ N , V ∈ B(Ai), a1:t−1, xit,
σi(V |a1:t−1, x
i
t) ≥ ǫL(V ) (10)
If Ai is discrete the above condition boils down to: for all i ∈ N , aj ∈ Ai, a1:t−1, xit,
σi(aj |a1:t−1, x
i
t) ≥ ǫ (11)
(b) Let Σǫ2 ⊆ Σ
ǫ
1 be the space of such strategies such that if σ ∈ Σ
ǫ
2 then for all a1:t−1, â1:t−1 such
that if
P σ(xt|a1:t−1) = P
σ(xt|â1:t−1) ∀xt, (12)
it implies,
σit(·|a1:t−1, x
i
t) = σ
i
t(·|â1:t−1, x
i
t) ∀i, x
i
t. (13)
(The above condition ensures the property of structured policies such that if two action histories
produce the same common belief under a strategy, then the strategy is indifferent towards those
two action histories).
2L can be Lesbesgue measure on Euclidean space and counting measure on a discrete space.
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7Then Σǫ2 is a compact metric space.
Proof:
(a) Let σn be any sequence of strategies in Σǫ1. Thus i ∈ N , V ∈ B(A
i), aj, a1:t−1, x
i
t,
σi,n(V |a1:t−1, xit) ≥ ǫL(V ). Thus limn σ
i,n(V |a1:t−1, xit) ≥ ǫL(V ). Thus Σ
ǫ
1 is closed. It is also
bounded. Thus Σǫ1 is compact.
(b) Let S(a1:t−1, â1:t−1) := {σ ∈ Σǫ1 : ∀xt, P
σ(xt|a1:t−1) = P σ(xt|â1:t−1)}. Clearly S(a1:t−1, â1:t−1)
is not empty since the strategy that is independent of action history always lies in this set.
Let R(a1:t−1, â1:t−1) := {σ ∈ Σǫ1 : ∀i, x
i
t σ
i
t(·|a1:t−1, x
i
t) = σ
i
t(·|â1:t−1, x
i
t)}. R(a1:t−1, â1:t−1) is
non empty for the same reason.
Then Σǫ2 =
⋂
a1:t−1,â1:t−1
(
Sc(a1:t−1, â1:t−1)
⋃
R(a1:t−1, â1:t−1)
)
.
Let V(a1:t−1, â1:t−1) := {g ∈ R|X |×|A|
t−1
: g(a1:t−1) = g(â1:t−1)}. Since S(a1:t−1, â1:t−1) is
intersection of Σǫ1, which is compact, with subspace V(a1:t−1, â1:t−1), thus S(a1:t−1, â1:t−1) is
also compact.
LetW(a1:t−1, â1:t−1) := {f = (f i)i, f i ∈ R|X |×|A|
t−1×|X i| : ∀i, xit, f
i(a1:t−1, x
i
t) = f
i(â1:t−1, x
i
t)}.
Then R(a1:t−1, â1:t−1) is the intersection of S(a1:t−1, â1:t−1) with subspace W(a1:t−1, â1:t−1),
thus R(a1:t−1, â1:t−1) is also compact.
This implies Σǫ2 is non-empty and compact.
Theorem 3: There exists an SPBE for such a game.
Proof: Define a perturbation of the game by restricting the set of strategies to Σǫ2. Since
utilities are continuous in strategies on Σǫ2 (as all strategies put non zero measure on every non
empty open set in the action space which implies the Bayes rule has denominator non-zero), and
Σǫ2 is a compact metric space by Lemma 1, every such perturbed game has a Nash equilibrium
by Glicksberg fixed-point Theorem [6]. Consider a sequence of such perturbed games in which
ǫ→ 0; by the compactness of the set of strategy profiles, some sequence of selections from the
sets of Nash equilibria of the games in the sequence converges, say to σ∗. Then σ∗ is an SPBE
of the game.
Theorem 4: There exists a solution to the fixed-point equation (7) for each t, πt.
Proof: Since there exists an SPBE for such a game from Theorem 3 and every SPBE can
be found from [1, Theorem 4], thus there exists a solution to (7) for each t, πt.
Remark In this paper, we showed that there exists a solution of smaller fixed-point equa-
tions (7) for each t, πt by showing that there exists a solution to the fixed-point equation which is
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8the Nash equilibrium of the whole game, using Glicksberg Fixed-point equation. It is interesting
because the smaller fixed-point equations may and does have discontinuous utilities, as seen
through numerical solutions. There have been some results known in existence of solutions of
games with discontinuous utilities [7], [8]. It would be an interesting exercise to explore the
connection between existence of the two results.
V. CONCLUSION
Authors in [1] proposed a novel methodology to find structured perfect Bayesian equilibria of
a general model of dynamic games of asymmetric information where players observe their types
privately, which evolve as a controlled Markov process, condition on everyones actions. Players
also observe everyone’s actions publicly. In this paper, we prove the existence of the fixed-point
equation that crucially appears in their methodology for each time t and that was left open in
that paper.
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